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Roles of Judges and Attorneys




In many jurisdictions, the roles of judges and attorneys in
modern civil procedure are becoming multi-faceted and, accordingly,
more and more complex. This tendency continues unabated as new
elements of their roles emerge; however, problems can arise when
these elements conflict. Judges and attorneys in Japan, and
conceivably in many advanced countries, have conducted their
everyday practice without any reliable lodestar. Neither have
academics developed sufficient theories to remedy this puzzling
situation. The general situation in many countries can be summarized
as set out below.
Against a backdrop of increased complaints about delay, and a
strong desire for efficiency in civil litigation, there is a heightened
expectation that judges will take a new role as active case manager,
along with their traditional role of passive and neutral umpire.1
However, it is easy to discern a tense relationship between these two
roles. While the notion of a passive and neutral umpire is based on
the principle of party autonomy, the notion of an active case manager
* Keio University, Faculty of Law. The author would like to thank Katsumi Chiba,
Yoshiki Yamaura, Makoto Ito, Sumio Moriwaki, Kazuhiko Yamamoto, Shintaro
Kato, Arabella Dove, Kotaro Tanaka and Takanori Kawashima for their invaluable
help in preparing this paper.
1. See, e.g., Marjorie 0. Rendell, What is the Role of the Judge in Our Litigious
Society?, 40 VILL. L. REv. 1115, 1116-20 (1995) (describing the change in roles of
federal judges in the United States and noting that "the judge's role now includes lion
tamer, shepherd, timekeeper and director. She is not only in charge of quality
control, but also must monitor and insure the progress of the product as it moves
along the assembly line.").
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is based on a belief that judges should be given wide discretion and
strong powers. Furthermore, as the pressure to settle increases in
modern litigation, so does the number of cases in which judges act as
mediators. The judge's role as a mediator could easily conflict with
his umpiring role.2
The potential for conflict applies equally to attorneys. On one
hand, an attorney must play the role of champion, bearing a duty to
maximize the benefits and minimize the losses to his client. On the
other hand, an attorney is expected to act as an officer of the court,
participating in the administration of justice. Although the
connotations of "officer of the court" are unclear,3 there is no doubt
that the position involves a duty to seek substantive justice. It is
obvious that the duties inherent in these dual roles may clash with
each other.
The specific details of these problems are by no means the same
in all countries due to differences in judicial systems and legal
cultures. In this paper I will outline the Japanese situation and
provide observers with similar issues for discussion at the symposium.
In particular, I will focus on the most recent reform of the Japanese
Code of Civil Procedure (the New Code), which occurred in 1996.'
The reform introduced several innovative devices, none of which
contained sanction provisions for implementation or enforcement of
their legal effect. The inclination towards non-sanction schemes of
this kind reflects the recent trend in reforms. The non-sanction
scheme inevitably has an influence on the roles of judges and
attorneys. Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether a non-
2. Due to space and time constraints, this paper does not cover discussions with
regard to the role of judges as mediators.
3. See, e.g., George A. Riemer, Officers of the Court: What does it Mean?, 61 OR.
STATE BAR BULL. 27, 27 (2001) (arguing that the notion of "officers of the court" is
"ambiguous in meaning and gets in the way of understanding the source and scope of
the ethical duties of lawyers"); Paul J. Lipscomb & Jonathan Diehl, Officers of the
Court: Another Perspective, 62 OR. STATE BAR BULL. 29, 29 (2002) (opposing the
above-cited argument of George A. Riemer). The situation in Japan is very similar.
An attorney in Japan is also deemed to be an officer of the court in a broad sense, a
term which is quite ambiguous.
4. For general accounts of the 1996 reform of the Code of Civil Procedure, see
Yasuhei Taniguchi, The 1996 Code of Civil Procedure of Japan-A Procedure for the
Coming Century?, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 767 (1997); Takeshi Kojima, Japanese Civil
Procedure in Comparative Law Perspective, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 687 (1998); Masahiko
Omura, A Comparative Analysis of Trial Preparation: Some Aspects of the New
Japanese Code of Civil Procedure, in TOWARD COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 723 (Takayuki Shiibashi ed., 1998); Shozo Ota, Reform of Civil Procedure
in Japan, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 561 (2001).
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sanction scheme is the most desirable device for controlling the roles
of judges and attorneys from a long-term perspective.
2. 1996 Reform of the Code of Civil Procedure
The Bill for Reform of the Code of Civil Procedure was passed
by the Japanese Diet on June 18, 1996, and came into effect on
January 1, 1998.' The main purpose of the reform was to reduce the
delay, cost and complexity of civil procedure-all of which were
preventing the general public from obtaining timely and adequate
judicial relief.6 The slogan of the reform was: "To make civil
procedure easy to access and easy to understand." To this end, the
New Code introduced an "Issue-Evidence Management Procedure"
and an "Expanded Evidence Gathering Procedure," among other
reforms.
It is important to note that this reform of the Code did not start
from scratch. There had been spontaneous and partially organized
efforts by some judges and attorneys to improve their practices prior
to the enactment of the New Code.7 These efforts were not always
successful, however, due to the limits inherent in practical reform
without legislative support. Furthermore, many other practitioners
were reluctant to change the status quo, towards which they were
generally apathetic. The call for drastic reform ultimately required a
visible torch, which was provided in the form of the New Code.
5. The Rules of Civil Procedure which supplement the Code were also revised
and proclaimed by the Supreme Court in December 17, 1996, and became effective
on January 1, 1998. For an English version of the 1996 Code of Civil Procedure and
1996 Rules of Civil Procedure, see HOUSOUKAI, ENGLISH-JAPANESE PARALLEL
TRANSLATION: THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN JAPAN (1999).
6. The original Japanese Code of Civil Procedure, modeled on the German
Code of Civil Procedure of 1877, was first enacted in 1890 and thereafter was
drastically amended in 1926 and 1948. For more details of the history and the
features of the old Code in general, see TAKAAKI HATTORI & DAN FENNO
HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN § 1.03[5] (Taniguchi et al. eds., 2d ed.
2000). See also Taniguchi, supra note 4, at 767-68; Kojima, supra note 4, at 693-95.
7. See, e.g., GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE SUPREME COURT, REPORT ON
STUDY OF MEASURES TO IMPROVE PROCEEDINGS IN CIVIL CASES AT TOKYO DISTRICT
COURT (1990) (in Japanese); GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE SUPREME COURT,
RECORD OF DISCUSSIONS ON QUALITY AND SPEED OF PROCEEDINGS IN CIVIL CASES
(1991) (in Japanese); KATSUMI SHINOHARA ET AL., STUDY OF NEW MEASURES IN
PROCEEDINGS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE (JUDICIAL RESEARCH REPORT No. 48-1) (1996)
(in Japanese).
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(1) Issue-Evidence Management Procedure
The Issue-Evidence Management Procedure moved Japanese
civil procedure away from the European unitary model and toward
the American pre-trial conference system.' Prior to the reform, the
Japanese courts used a single procedural stage called "Koutou-
Benron" (Oral Argument) 9 combining the preparatory stage and the
evidence examination stage of civil litigation. Oral Argument
included every activity in the civil litigation process, including:
arrangement of issues in controversy; allegation; denial; admission;
examination of witnesses; examination of material evidence; and
management of proceedings. The conflation of these activities,
together with lax procedural rules, rendered the process of Oral
Argument largely ineffective. Under this system, parties could
present a totally new argument even after the examination of
witnesses had finished, and parties and judges did not have to prepare
seriously for an adversarial Oral Argument. Dates for Oral
Argument were set sporadically, with intervals of a month or two, and
the process degenerated into a mere exchange of legal briefs.'
Examination of witnesses took place almost aimlessly since parties
and judges could not focus on the crucial issues. The situation was
sarcastically referred to as the "Drifting Procedure," because it was as
if the parties and the judge embarked on a voyage without a chart.
Naturally, the situation caused unnecessary delays and costs.1
Faced with this situation, practitioners invented an amorphous
procedure called "Benron-ken-Wakai" (Oral Argument combined
with Settlement) where the preparation for evidence examination,
settlement negotiations and substantial oral argument were
conducted simultaneously in a closed room such as a judge's chamber,
a settlement room or a "preparation room."' 2 This procedure had no
statutory basis, and its legal character was very ambiguous.
The Oral Argument/Settlement process was devised mainly for
8. For additional accounts of Issue-Evidence Management Procedure, see
Taniguchi, supra note 4, at 772-73; Kojima, supra note 4, at 704-06; Omura, supra
note 4, at 727-29; Ota, supra note 4, at 568-69.
9. This and other English versions of Japanese terms are the author's own
translation.
10. See Ota, supra note 4, at 568-69.
11. See Taniguchi, supra note 4, at 769-70; Kojima, supra note 4, at 689-91;
Omura, supra note 4, at 723-24.
12. For additional accounts of Benron-ken-Wakai, see Taniguchi, supra note 4, at
771-72; Ota, supra note 4, at 569.
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three reasons. 3 First, the informal atmosphere of a closed room was
considered efficient for conducting preparation proceedings.
Although it was generally recognized that the Drifting Procedure
should be abolished, it was felt that preparation proceedings
conducted in an open court might put psychological pressure on the
parties and inhibit the free exchange of argument. Second, the nature
of Oral Argument/Settlement, being a mixture of settlement
negotiations and substantial oral argument, was thought to promote
settlement by allowing the court to lead a party reluctant to
compromise into settlement negotiations, to use information
produced during oral argument as the basis for settlement negotiation
and vice versa. Third, it gave judges a certain degree of latitude to
exercise their paternalistic discretion, especially when one or more
parties acted pro se. Japanese judges tend to be paternalistic and
support the weaker side; the closed room and informal procedure was
regarded as suitable for doing so. In addition to these reasons, one of
the most noteworthy features of Oral Argument/Settlement, which
made it attractive to practitioners, was that it was based on a non-
sanction scheme.
Some academics and practitioners challenged the legality of the
informal Oral Argument/Settlement procedure, 14 although such
discussions were ad hoc rather than organized. To clarify the
situation, the drafters of the New Code decided to legally authorize
the Oral Argument/Settlement procedure, but with some necessary
revisions. The New Code introduced the "Issue-Evidence
Management Procedure," which has three branches, namely:
"Junbiteki-Koutou-Benron" (Preliminary Oral Hearing) (Arts. 164-
67), "Benron-Junbi-Tetsuzuki" (Preparatory Proceedings for Oral
Hearing) (Arts. 168-74) and "Shomen-ni-yoru-Junbi-Tetsuzuki"
(Document-Based Preparatory Proceedings) (Arts. 175-78).
The Preparatory Proceedings for Oral Hearing procedure is a
direct descendant of Oral Argument/Settlement, and addresses
criticism of the old procedure by incorporating its advantages while
ameliorating its flaws. For example, although the Preparatory
13. See, e.g., LEGAL RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE, STUDY OF PRACTICE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 94-96 (1989) (in Japanese); Symposium, Benron-ken-Wakai, 37
J. CiV. PROC. 49, 79 (1991) (in Japanese).
14. See, e.g., Kaneyoshi Hagiwara, Observations on 'Benron-ken-Wakai,' 734
HANREI TAIMUZU 8 (1990) (in Japanese); Symposium, Toward the Reform of Civil
Procedure in Japan, 39 J. Civ. PROC. 89, 133 (1993) (statement of Hiroyuki
Matsumoto) (in Japanese); OSAKA BAR ASSOCIATION, OPINION WITH REGARD TO
IMPROVEMENT OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1991) (in Japanese).
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Proceedings for Oral Hearing are held in a closed room in a similar
way to those of Oral Argument/Settlement, the court may allow
interested or relevant persons to sit in on the proceedings, and the
court will admit persons who are requested by a party to attend
(Art. 169(2)). In some cases, especially where a party resides in a
remote place, the court may choose to conduct the proceedings by
means of telephone conference (Art. 170(3)).
The purpose of Preparatory Proceedings for Oral Hearing is
limited to narrowing down the issues and obtaining better evidence.
Settlement negotiations cannot take place at the same time as
Preparatory Proceedings for Oral Hearing. The results of the
proceedings must be orally stated at Oral Argument (Art. 173). It
must be noted that the non-sanction scheme was incorporated into
each branch of the Issue-Evidence Management Procedure (as
discussed later in relation to Preparatory Proceedings for Oral
Hearing). The Preparatory Proceedings for Oral Hearing procedure
is currently the most popular of the three branches of the Issue-
Evidence Management Procedure and is used in an overwhelming
majority of cases.
(2) Expanded Evidence Gathering Procedure
In our modern society, important evidence for litigation tends to
be concentrated in the hands of one party (such as the state, local
governments, large companies, etc.). The old Code, however, did not
furnish enough devices to redress this imbalance. It gave parties only
limited means to gather information and evidence compared to the
extensive American discovery process, or even its milder English
counterpart.1
Grievances about evidence gathering were centered on the
following points: (a) there was no way to make inquiries of the
opposing party about relevant information in order to dig further into
the details of the case or gather evidence; (b) by enumerating specific
requirements that had to be met in an application for a document
production order, the old Code placed the onus of proving
compliance on the party making the application (rather than on the
opposing party or a third party claiming a privilege); and (c) a party
applying for a document production order had to identify individual
documents by indicating their titles and an outline of their contents.
Unlike in the American discovery process, identification of
15. See Taniguchi, supra note 4, at 775-76; Omura, supra note 4, at 729-30.
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documents by category was not permitted. This procedural
requirement was a veritable "mission impossible" for applicants.
During the process of drafting the New Code, it was argued that
an American type of discovery process should be adopted.16 The
business community and the government were strongly opposed to
such reform, however, and the idea was abandoned at an early stage."
Instead, the New Code adopted three rather moderate devices that
paved the way for gathering information and evidence. First,
"Tojisha-Shoukai" (Party Inquiry), a method of obtaining
information from the opposing party which is basically modeled on
the interrogatories of the United States, was introduced for the first
time (Art. 163).18 After litigation has commenced, a party can make
written inquiries of the opposing party about matters necessary for
assertions or proof and request written responses within a reasonable
period set by the inquiring party. However, the opposing party can
refuse to answer on the grounds that the questions are too abstract,
too vague, insulting, embarrassing, repetitive, or that they request
opinion, require undue expense or time to answer or relate to
privileged matters. Second, the New Code abolished the limitation
set by the scope of the document production order and introduced the
concept of a "general duty" to produce documents (Art. 220).9 This
means that any person who possesses documents is obliged to
produce them unless they fall under the exceptions provided in the
Code. 20 Finally, the New Code also introduced "Document
Identification Proceedings" to alleviate difficulties faced by an
applicant for a document production order in trying to identify in
16. See, e.g., Makoto Ito, Ideals and Significance of Discovery Proceedings:
Focusing on Introduction of Reform of the Code of Civil Procedure (pts. 1-2), 786
HANREI TAIMUZU 6, 6-11 (1992), 787 HANREI TAIMUZU 11, 30 (1992) (in Japanese).
17. See COUNSELOR'S OFFICE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF MINISTRY OF
JUSTICE, SUPPLEMENTARY EXPLANATION FOR OUTLINE OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
TO CIVIL LITIGATION PROCEEDINGS 34 (1993) (in Japanese).
18. For additional accounts of Tojisha-Shoukai, see Taniguchi, supra note 4, at
779; Kojima, supra note 4, at 701-02; Omura, supra note 4, at 730-31; Ota, supra note
4, at 570. See also Masanori Kawano, Tojisha-Shoukai, in 2 STRUCTURE OF THE NEW
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 144, 152 (Shozo Miyake et al. eds., 1997) (in Japanese).
19. For additional accounts of "general duty," see Taniguchi, supra note 4, at 776-
77; Kojima, supra note 4, at 702; Omura, supra note 4, at 730-31; Ota, supra note 4, at
570.
20. The exceptions are categorized into five groups in Article 220 of the Code,
namely, documents that are: (a) self-incriminatory; (b) concerned with a
governmental secret; (c) concerned with a professional or trade secret; (d) made for
the exclusive use of their holder; and (e) concerned with a criminal or juvenile
protection case.
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advance the documents to be produced (Art. 222).1 Where it is
difficult for an applicant to indicate the title and outline of a
particular document, he can instead point to other characteristics
which enable the holder of that document to identify it. The court
will then, upon a motion by the applicant, request the holder to
disclose to the applicant the title and outline of the particular
document.
3. Features and Consequences of the 1996 Reform
A common feature of the new devices described above is that
they do not have any sanctions or coercive power to compel
enforcement. In other words, the New Code has introduced several
new devices that basically depend on the good faith of the parties and
their attorneys. To the best of the author's knowledge, this
development found in the New Code is unique when compared to the
devices used in civil procedure in the rest of the world.
(1) Legal Effect of the Issue-Evidence Management Procedure
The most noteworthy feature of the newly introduced Issue-
Evidence Management Procedure is that it makes no provision for
sanctions. Once the parties and the court have reached consensus
about how to streamline a case using the Issue-Evidence Management
Procedure, allegations and evidence that were never raised or that
were laid aside in that procedure can no longer be produced in Oral
Argument by a party who was involved in the Issue-Evidence
Management Procedure. It would be natural in this kind of
preparatory procedure for a plenary hearing to be accompanied by
some kind of preclusionary effect. However, the drafters of the New
Code did not adopt this attitude because they feared repeating the
failures caused by the preparatory procedure provided for in Article
255 of the old Code. The story widely and traditionally believed is as
follows. The preparatory procedure contained in the old Code had a
rigid preclusionary effect and was quite unpopular with practitioners.
As a result of this inflexible approach, parties and their attorneys
tended to produce a massive number of hypothetical allegations with
insignificant details and evidence with little value due to fear of being
precluded from raising these claims in the future. This resulted in
21. For additional accounts of "Document Identification Proceedings," see
Taniguchi, supra note 4, at 778; Kojima, supra note 4, at 703; Omura, supra note 4, at
731-32.
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serious delay and inefficiency. At the same time, the court was
reluctant to enforce the preclusionary effect for fear that injustice
could result from the preclusion of crucial allegations or evidence.
The old procedure, thus, was seldom used.22
The drafters of the New Code decided to introduce a maverick
scheme instead of adopting a traditional preclusion scheme. Under
the New Code, a party who intends to produce an allegation or
evidence that was never raised or was laid aside during the Issue-
Evidence Management Procedure in the course of Oral Argument
must explain why that allegation or evidence was not advanced prior
to the conclusion of the preparatory stage (Arts. 167, 174 & 178). This
is called the "duty to explain." However, when the party who has a
duty to explain cannot show a convincing reason, or does not explain
at all, the Code is silent and no direct sanctions are imposed.
What about indirect sanctions? Some academics and
practitioners have suggested some possible ways of dealing with this
situation.' The court may dismiss the allegation or evidence where
the court finds that they were produced after the conclusion of the
preparatory stage, either intentionally or through gross negligence,
and where it is deemed that production would cause a delay to the
conclusion of the litigation (Art. 157(1)). The court also has
discretion as to the value it places on the facts in deciding the merit of
the case under the Principle of Free Determination (Art. 247).24 In
addition, where an attorney has acted on behalf of a party, a default
due to a failure to satisfy the "duty to explain" may be a breach of
professional ethics and trigger sanctions by the bar associations.
After all, the discretion of judges and the good faith of the parties and
attorneys have great significance under this scheme.
(2) Legal Effect of the Party Inquiry
The Party Inquiry procedure, which is based on the model of the
interrogatories of discovery in the United States, was introduced by
22. See Taniguchi, supra note 4, at 770-71; Kojima, supra note 4, at 690-91;
Omura, supra note 4, at 724.
23. See, e.g., Shintaro Kato, Improvement of Issue-Evidence Management
Procedure: Characterization of Issues from a Judge's Standpoint, in THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF THE NEW CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 207, 230 (Houichi Tsukahara et
al. eds., 1997) (in Japanese); see also Omura, supra note 4, at 728.
24. Article 247 provides that "[i]n rendering a judgment, the court shall,
considering the entire import of the oral argument and the result of the examination
of evidence, and based upon its freely determined conviction, decide whether or not
the allegations of fact are true." HOUSOUKAI, supra note 5, at 194.
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the 1996 Reform. However, there are several differences between
Party Inquiry and interrogatories. First, the Party Inquiry procedure
imposes no direct sanctions when the opposing party refuses to
answer without reasonable grounds, or even when he intentionally
answers by making false statements. Furthermore, Party Inquiry is
completely based upon the principle of party autonomy, and no party
can seek any order from the court. Finally, whereas interrogatories in
the United States must be answered in writing under oath, there is no
oath requirement when answering Party Inquiry. In short, there are
no means to compel an answer or guarantee a truthful answer.
Party Inquiry can be used by either attorneys or parties who are
not legal practioners. Because the scheme does not include direct
sanctions, it can only function where it is supported by the ideal
practice of good attorneys. This means the Party Inquiry procedure is
totally dependent on professional ethics. Therefore, the bar
associations, which strongly pressed for the introduction of this device
into the New Code, have released forms and guidelines for the Party
Inquiry procedure. 5 Moreover, some academics and practitioners
have argued that one can suppose that concepts such as the "duty of
good faith" or the "duty of cooperation to search for the truth" are
behind the provisions of Party Inquiry.26 However, this scheme may
easily raise a conflict for attorneys between their duties as legal
professionals and their duty to protect their clients. What should
attorneys do, for example, if their clients ask them to refuse to
answer? No one can give an answer with confidence.
(3) Legal Effect of Document Identification Proceedings
Similarly, Document Identification Proceedings provide no
sanctions to force the holder of documents to disclose their title and
outline. As a matter of fact, in accordance with Article 222(2), the
court can only "request" rather than "order" disclosure. In this sense,
in Document Identification Proceedings, the court is expected to act
as a mediator between the applicant and the holder of the document.
25. See, e.g., DAINI TOKYO BAR ASSOCIATION: COMMITTEE FOR RESEARCH INTO
CIVIL PROCEDURE PRACTICE IMPROVEMENT, PRACTICE MANUAL ON THE NEW CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 106-19 (1997) (in Japanese); TOKYO BAR ASSOCIATION:
SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE ISSUES OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND
OTHERS, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF TOISHA-SHOUKAI (2000) (in Japanese).
26. See, e.g., Mikio Akiyama, Role of Tojisha-Shoukai, in ISSUES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE LAW 166 (Yoshimitsu Aoyama & Makoto Ito eds., 3rd. ed. 1998) (in
Japanese); MAKOTO ITO, CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW 231 (revised ed. 2000) (in
Japanese).
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The court can do nothing if the holder refuses to disclose. Soon after
the enactment of the New Code, conflicting views were expressed as
to this problem. One view is that, where the holder ignores the court
' s request to disclose and the applicant ultimately fails by other
means to identify the document sought, the motion for the Document
Production Order should be dismissed. This is the view of a former
Ministry of Justice counselor who chiefly took charge of drafting the
New Code.27 However, some academics argue that the court has
discretion in such a case to issue a Document Production Order,
provided that: the applicant has at least identified the document by
category; the order does not impose too great a burden on the holder;
and the applicant does not have any other means to prove the fact
that could be proved by the document sought.'
4. The Role of Judges Under Non-Sanction Schemes
It seems to the author that the strong preference of the drafters
for non-sanction schemes is related to the role of Japanese judges as
active case managers.29 Judges as case managers tend to be vigorous
in administering procedures efficiently. Non-sanction schemes can
take the edge off the frequent interventions of judges into party
autonomy. This hypothesis can be established representatively by
looking at the Preparatory Proceedings for Oral Hearing procedure.
Judges often play a more central role than the parties or
attorneys in Preparatory Proceedings for Oral Hearing. This could
have several causes. First, it is deemed ineffective to leave case
management to the parties. Each party tends to manoeuvre for a
position, and this easily leads to inefficiency. Therefore, it is widely
believed that judges should control the process in Preparatory
27. COUNSELOR'S OFFICE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF MINISTRY OF JUSTICE,
EXCHANGE OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE NEW CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
260, 263 (1996) (in Japanese) [hereinafter COUNSELOR'S OFFICE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS].
28. See, e.g., TEIICHIRO NAKANO, COMMENTARY ON THE NEW CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 54 (1997) (in Japanese); Koichi Miki, Document Production Order (4):
Document Identification Proceedings, in 3 STRUCTURE OF THE NEW CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 178, 202-06 (Shozo Miyake et al. eds., 1997) (in Japanese).
29. Criticisms of the principle of managerial judging are seldom heard in Japan,
unlike in the United States. According to a notable judge who introduced the
argument written in Managerial Judges, an article by Professor Judith Resnik, "[i]n
order to distribute finite resources as effectively as practicable and to deal with cases
efficiently and properly, the introduction of management techniques into the
administration of modem civil procedure is inevitable." Shintaro Kato, Cooperative
Administration of Lawsuits and Management, in CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW IN THE ERA
OF RESTRUCTURING 148, 156 (2000) (in Japanese).
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Proceedings for Oral Hearing. In addition, judges are expected to be
investigators under the continental procedural system. Usually they
do not hesitate to make inquiries of the parties in order to clarify the
issues and to request the production of evidence that they deem
essential to the case. This is true in Japan, even though Japanese civil
procedure is no longer a full-blooded continental system. 30
Furthermore, judges are usually skilled in sorting out case-related
issues, and parties and attorneys tend to rely on the judges' skills. In
fact, often the judges themselves (rather than the parties) prepare
memoranda-illustrating the preference of the courts for a judicially-
guided arrangement of the issues and potential evidence.3
The attitudes of the courts would be less advantageous for the
parties and attorneys if the New Code imposed a sanction scheme.
Observers from foreign countries might question how the court can
lead the process of trial management without any sanctions against
parties and attorneys. To be sure, there are no direct sanctions, but
there are a number of indirect or de facto compulsory measures which
the court can exercise. As mentioned above, the court can dismiss
both allegations and evidence produced at an improper time; it can
take the behavior of parties into consideration when it renders a
judgment; and attorneys can be punished by the bar associations for a
breach of professional ethics with regard to their activities in
Preparatory Proceedings for Oral Hearing. In addition, parties and
their attorneys are usually very sensitive to the moods of judges.
Japanese judges have the final say about a judgment, since there is no
jury system in Japan. Based on this authority, as a matter of practice,
courts can force parties or attorneys who do not bear the burden of
proof on a certain fact to disclose information or produce materials
related to the fact. Moreover, to intensify this power, judges
occasionally show a provisional decision or prospective judgment to
parties in Preparatory Proceedings for Oral Hearing.32 Parties
30. See Yasuhei Taniguchi, Between Verhandlungsmaxime and Adversary System:
In Search for Place of Japanese Civil Procedure, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR KARL HEINZ
SCHWAB 487 (Peter Gottwald & Harms PrUtting eds., 1990) (noting that Japanese
civil procedure lies somewhere between the German and American models in the
scale of adversarial systems).
31. See, e.g., Takahisa Fukuda, New Practice of Civil Procedure, 1077 HANREI
TAIMUZU 26, 27 (2002) (stating that it is difficult for attorneys to sort out the issues
by themselves without the help of judges' skills; the author is a notable iudge) (in
Japanese).
32. Recently in Japan, it has been seen as advantageous for judges to show
provisional decisions or prospective judgments to parties in Preparatory Proceedings
for Oral Hearing, although some doubts remain. See, e.g., YOSHIMI IWASA ET AL.,
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virtually have no choice except to obey the request of the court, even
where there are no statutory obligations; otherwise they risk losing
the case. In this way, a non-sanction scheme is workable where some
indirect or de facto compulsory measures exist, as they certainly do in
some aspects of the Japanese civil procedure system.
There would seem to be a conflict between managerial judging
and party autonomy. However, complaints about managerial judging
are seldom heard from parties or attorneys. On the contrary, many
Japanese attorneys and parties seem to anticipate being led by the
courts during Preparatory Proceedings for Oral Hearing.33 Judges are
therefore inclined to play a paternalistic role not only in Preparatory
Proceedings for Oral Hearing but also in many other aspects of civil
procedure. With judges trying to be paternalistic and parties and
attorneys content to sit on their hands, the system achieves a strange
but harmonious balance.
There are several reasons for this. First, there has been little
adversarial legal culture within the Japanese legal profession as
compared with that of the United States or some other common law
countries.' Second, under the bureaucratic career system, the quality
of Japanese judges has been maintained at a relatively high and
homogeneous level. Third, since before World War II, judges were
regarded as the best, the brightest and the guardians of the legal
professional circle: some vestiges of that perception still remain."
STUDY OF THE PRACTICE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 86-92 (JUDICIAL RESEARCH REPORT
No. 40-1) (1988) (in Japanese); TAKESHI KOJIMA ET AL., 2 READING BOOK ON CIVIL
PRACTICE 176-85 (1990) (in Japanese); Makoto Ito, Issue Management Proceedings in
Civil Procedure, 43-9 Houso Jlno 23 (1991) (in Japanese); Takehiro Hara, Indication
of Legal Views and Disclosure of Provisional Decision by Judge, in ISSUES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE LAW 188 (Yoshimitsu Aoyama & Makoto Ito eds., 3d ed. 1998) (in
Japanese).
33. See, e.g., Michiharu Hayashi, Current Issues in Civil Procedure Following the
1996 Reform of the Code of Civil Procedure, 181 MINJIHO JOUHO 2, 4 (2001) (arguing
that attorneys' tendency to depend on the court has not changed even following
enactment of the New Code in 1998) (in Japanese).
34. Soon after World War II, the influence of the American adversarial legal
culture was seen not only in legislation but also in lawyers' ways of thinking. Some
examples, however, have been diminished to reach a compromise with reality. For
example, judges refrained from using their right of clarification in practice, and
initially the decisions of the Supreme Court supported this. But it soon became clear
that the paternalistic intervention of judges was unavoidably necessary, and practice
has returned to the pre-War situation. The Supreme Court also changed its attitude
in the latter half of the 1950s. See Taniguchi, supra note 30, at 500.
35. For general accounts of professional education and career system of judges,
see Yasuhei Taniguchi, Problems of Under-Graduate and Graduate Legal Education
in Japan, in LEGAL EDUCATION IN INDIA: PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES 112 (S.K.
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Fourth, Japanese attorneys have not yet been exposed to the full-
scale competitive market mechanism because they are still so small in
number.36 Consequently, they do not always have to be zealous
advocates. Finally, because parties can represent themselves without
attorneys under the Japanese civil procedure system, they litigate pro
se in a large number of cases. In such cases, judges must always be
paternalistic.7
5. The Role of Attorneys Under Non-Sanction Schemes
The introduction of the concept of a general duty to produce
documents has been a significant breakthrough accomplished by the
New Code. To support this, Document Identification Proceedings
were introduced in conjunction with the New Code. To date,
however, there have been no reported cases in which Document
Identification Proceedings were held. This is not really surprising.
The practical effectiveness of Document Identification Proceedings
has always been in doubt.38 It is generally said that without sanctions,
parties and attorneys have no incentive to instigate these proceedings.
It is also said that even if a party instigates such proceedings the court
would be reluctant to hear them, since there is no way to enforce an
order against the holder of the documents. 9 It appears that, even if
the court heard the proceedings and even if it requested the attorney
to disclose information about documents held by his client, the
attorney might still reject the request, in possible violation of
professional ethics. Even if it is true that the attorney has a duty to
obey the court's request, it is equally true that he also has a
potentially conflicting ethical duty: to protect his client.
A similar situation exists with respect to the Party Inquiry
Agrawala et al. eds., 1973); Yasuhei Taniguchi, The Post-War Court System as an
Instrument for Social Change, in INSTITUTIONS FOR CHANGE IN JAPANESE SOCIETY 20
(George De Vos ed., 1984).
36. See Shozo Ota & Kahei Rokumoto, Issues of the Lawyer Population: Japan,
25 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 315, 315 (1993).
37. See Taniguchi, supra note 30, at 495 (noting that "[i]f the parties are just in
person, the judge's role must be very different. The judge must also play the role of
attorney for both parties.... Since there can be no meaningful legal communication,
the judge's legal view is simply imposed. Legally ignorant parties can but follow the
judge's suggestion to present the facts and evidence.").
38. See, e.g., MORIO TAKESHITA ET AL., WORKSHOP ON THE NEW CODE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 290 (statement of Takahisa Fukuda, 1999) (in Japanese); Hiroshi
Takahashi, On Examination of Evidence (8), 248 Hougaku Kyoushitsu 66 (2001) (in
Japanese).
39. See Takahashi, supra note 38, at 69 n.10.
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procedure. A considerable number of people have pinned their
hopes on it, although many others have doubted its effectiveness.
Five years have passed since the New Code came into effect, and it
has become clear that the latter view was correct. The number of
cases in which Party Inquiry is used has proven negligible. It is easy
to suppose that a major reason it is not used is the absence of a
mechanism through which parties may be compelled to respond to
the inquiry. In contrast, in the United States, if a party fails to answer
an interrogatory, the discovering party may seek an order from the
court compelling an answer. 4 If the party fails to obey that order, the
court may issue a further order that the matters sought in the
discovery order shall be taken to be established, or an order treating
the failure to respond as a contempt of court.4 The Japanese Party
Inquiry procedure has not proceeded along the same lines. The court
stays completely away from that process. However, no one disputes
that the party to whom Party Inquiry is addressed has a duty to
answer. 2 Therefore, a similar question to the one in the case of
Document Identification Proceedings can be posed: should the
attorney answer or refuse to reply to a Party Inquiry?
Interestingly, as we know from the legislative history of the New
Code, both attorneys and judges resisted the introduction of a
compulsory mechanism with respect to Party Inquiry. Although the
bar associations insisted on the necessity of a mechanism to make
Party Inquiry effective, they never suggested any sanction schemes.
Instead, they proposed a scheme whereby a party who applies for
Party Inquiry may send questionnaires not from himself but through
the court in which the action is pending. '3 There are no sanctions
under this scheme, even if the party who receives the questionnaire
fails to answer. The reasoning behind this proposal was that, on the
one hand, attorneys were reluctant to introduce an entirely new
oppressive scheme, while on the other hand, they wished to take
advantage of the authority of the court as a de facto compulsory
mechanism.
In the meantime, judges refused to countenance any schemes in
which they were obliged to be involved, including the scheme
suggested by the bar associations. The reasons for refusal were that:
40. See FED. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(5); FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
41. See FED. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(5); FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
42. See, e.g., COUNSELOR'S OFFICE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS, supra note 27, at 166;
NAKANO, supra note 28, at 35.
43. See TAKESHITA ET AL., supra note 38, at 167 (statement of Mutsuo Tahara).
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(a) involvement with Party Inquiry would violate the neutrality of
judges; (b) judges cannot decide whether the Party Inquiry is
adequate or not in the early stage of litigation; and (c) the issues in
which judges are interested and those in which the parties or their
attorneys are interested are not necessarily the same.' Setting aside
the dubiousness of these reasons, it is obvious that judges were hostile
to a scheme that might get them in trouble-because they either
made a serious error or unintentionally favored one of the parties-or
place a burden on them. As a consequence, Party Inquiry became not
only useless but also antinomic for attorneys. Supposing that there
was a sanction for a failure to answer, it could be a good excuse for
attorneys to persuade their clients to respond even when to do so
would be against their clients' will. Then we confront the question:
does a non-sanction scheme really protect attorneys or, on the
contrary, does it jeopardize them?
6. Expansion of Non-Sanction Schemes
The General Assembly of the Legislative Council of the Ministry
of Justice completed the "Outline for the Reform of a Part of the
Code of Civil Procedure" and reported to the Minister of Justice on
February 5, 2003."s It was codified in supplemented and revised
provisions to the Code of Civil Procedure by the Ministry of Justice
and presented to the Diet as a Cabinet bill on March 4, 2003.46 The
bill introduced several new devices, some of which were based on
non-sanction schemes.47 The principal devices based on non-sanction
schemes, or at least schemes with fewer sanctions, are as follows.
44. See id. at 168-69 (statement of Takahisa Fukuda).
45. The Ministry of Justice referred the matter of possible reform of the Code of
Civil Procedure and the Law of Procedure relating to Personal Status to the
Legislative Council on June 12, 2001. This was in response to the Report of the
Judicial System Reform Council under the Cabinet, which outlined a grand design for
the whole system of justice in Japan. The Legislative Council immediately
established a Working Group composed of judges, attorneys, professors and experts
from other fields, and it initiated deliberations on a reform of the Code of Civil
Procedure along with a reform of the Law of Procedure relating to Personal Status
from September 14, 2001. The Working Group, after meeting 15 times, completed a
draft "Outline for the Reform of a Part of the Code of Civil Procedure" on January
24, 2003.
46. For an account of the legislative process in Japan, see, e.g., Mamoru Seki, The
Drafting Process for Cabinet Bills, 19 LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 168 (1986).
47. The bill for Reform of a Part of the Code of Civil Procedure is available at
<www.moj.go.jp> (in Japanese). It passed at the Diet on July 9, 2003 and will
become effective at some time in 2004.
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(1) Schedule of Proceedings
The average length of civil litigation cases has shortened over the
past decade, and currently almost 90 percent of civil cases in courts of
first instance are concluded within two years, by either judgment or
settlement." This must be a result of not a few judges and attorneys
pushing themselves to improve their traditional way of practice.
While the embryonic movement of this change had started before the
reform of the Code of Civil Procedure, the New Code has provided
the movement with a firm foundation. In this aspect, the 1996 reform
has proven successful. However, in complicated or large-scale
cases-such as medical malpractice suits, architectural disputes and
mass tort cases-many cases still last more than five or even ten years
in courts of first instance alone. Such cases usually generate a series
of technical debates between experts or include examinations of
dozens of witnesses, and serious delay soon results.
To deal with this problem, the bill introduced the Schedule of
Proceedings (Draft Art. 147.3) concept. When the court finds that,
due to the complex nature of the case, it is necessary to set a schedule
for the proceedings in order to realize a just and timely resolution, the
court shall fix a schedule through discussions with both parties. The
schedule should include a time frame for the Issue-Evidence
Management Procedure, a time frame for the examination of
witnesses and the expected dates and times to close hearings and
render judgment. Each procedural step should be carried out in
accordance with the schedule. If the court finds that it is necessary to
implement the schedule, it may set a deadline for producing
allegations or evidence with regard to a specific matter. The court
can also dismiss allegations or evidence produced in breach of the
deadline if it finds that the breach may cause a significant disturbance
to the progress of litigation resulting from a delay in the schedule
(Draft Art. 157.2).
Accordingly, the Schedule of Proceedings incorporates a
48. See, e.g., Roundtable Discussion, Towards the Reform of the Code of Civil
Procedure: Focusing on the Tentative Proposal of the Outline for the Reform of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1229 JURIST 129, 134 tbl. 3 (2002) (in Japanese).
49. The average length of a medical malpractice case at first instance has recently
been approximately three years. See Koji Kurashima & Shinya Takahashi, Overviews
of Medical Malpractice Cases: Focusing on Judicial Statistics, 180 MINJIHO JOUHO 34,
39 tbl. 2 (2001) (in Japanese). Looking at all civil cases, there are no fewer than 1000
cases at first instance which remain pending for more than five years, and no fewer
than 100 cases which have lasted for more than ten years. See Hayashi, supra note 33,
at 5.
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sanction scheme. However, it remains to be seen whether or not the
scheme is effective. There are several reasons for its possible failure.
First, the court can dismiss allegations or evidence only when it finds
that the breach may cause a "significant" disturbance. The word
"significant" was inserted in the draft provision in order to alleviate
the severity of the preclusion effect. Second, the court cannot dismiss
allegations or evidence if a party can show a "considerable" reason
for missing the deadline. There were arguments about the use of
"considerable" and "imperative," and the former term was chosen for
the same reason that "significant" was adopted. Third, Japanese
judges are already equipped with a power which allows them to
dismiss allegations and evidence produced after the appropriate stage
of procedure has passed, under the existing Article 157(1), although
they are extremely reluctant to exercise this power. The new sanction
scheme provided in Draft Article 157.2 overlaps with Article 157(1)
to a considerable extent, and there is the possibility that it will follow
the same path to disuse.
(2) Evidence Gathering Procedure Based on Pre-Litigation Notice
It would be best if both parties obtained all necessary evidence or
information and had a clear view of how the proceedings are to
progress at the outset of the litigation. In particular, this is essential
for the success of a Schedule of Proceedings. To be sure, the current
Code of Civil Procedure provides for proceedings, called the
"Preservation of Evidence," to collect evidence at the pre-litigation
stage (Arts. 234-42). However, the party who files a motion for
Preservation of Evidence must show the circumstances which make
the availability of evidence difficult, absent preservation proceedings.
In other words, the Preservation of Evidence procedure can be used
only when the likelihood of interpolation or disappearance of
material evidence is very high. In response to the current situation,
the bill introduced "Evidence Gathering Procedure based on Pre-
Litigation Notice" (Draft Arts. 132.2-132.9).
A person who intends to file a suit can use the Evidence
Gathering Procedure when he or she issues a Pre-Litigation Notice to
the potential defendant. The former is called a "notice-giver," and
the latter is called a "notice-receiver." The notice-receiver can also
use Pre-Litigation Notice when he or she makes a reply to the notice-
giver. Pre-Litigation Notice is an advance notice in written form
which informs the notice-receiver of the notice-giver's intention to
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institute a lawsuit against the notice-receiver.5 ° The Evidence
Gathering Procedure based on Pre-Litigation Notice allows the
notice-giver and notice-receiver to: (a) make inquiries of the opposing
party in writing about matters necessary for preparation of allegations
or proof in future litigation (Draft Arts. 132.2-132.3); and (b) make a
motion to the court that: (i) the court request the holder of
documents to submit them to court; (ii) the court request various
organizations or entities including state departments, schools and
chambers of commerce for necessary assistance with research; (iii) the
court request experts to provide opinions; and (iv) the court order
bailiffs to undertake any necessary survey of the existing
circumstances of things or places related to the dispute (Draft
Art. 132.4).
This device conforms in all its aspects with a non-sanction
scheme. The basic features of the procedure described in (a) above
are very similar to those of Party Inquiry. The court does not commit
to the procedure in any respect, and there are no sanctions against an
unreasonable refusal or a false answer. With regard to (b)(i), (b)(ii)
and (b)(iii) above, the court can only make a "request" to such third
parties. There are also no sanctions when those third parties refuse
the request without reasonable grounds. There are no sanctions
against a breach of (b)(iv), either. The bailiff, who is ordered by the
court to undertake a survey, has no power to enforce his inspection.
7. Evaluation of Non-Sanction Schemes
When one evaluates non-sanction schemes, one must distinguish
between a criticism of the bare paternalism of courts generally, and a
criticism of paternalism under a non-sanction scheme. There are a
number of critical analyses of the former," although there are always
50. It is seen as difficult to allow parties to collect evidence and other materials
related to litigation at the pre-litigation stage, except in an emergency, since a party's
right to collect such information is understood to be a part of the right of access to
justice through the courts (KENPO, art. 32). The Pre-Litigation Notice procedure has
been established to resolve this problem. The drafters thought that a Pre-Litigation
Notice would generate a quasi lis pendens and would vest in parties the right to
collect evidence and other materials if the right would be less oppressive than one at
the litigation stage. However, neither the propriety of this procedure nor the import
of the quasi lis pendens has been fully analyzed yet.
51. See, e.g., Symposium, New Civil Procedure Code: Ideals and Practice, 48 J.
CIV. PROC. 103, 159 (statement of Shintaro Kato), 161 (statement of Hiroshi
Takahashi), 162 (statement of Takeshi Kojima) (2002) (in Japanese); Shintaro Kato,
Direction of Proceedings in Civil Procedure: From the Point of View of a Practitioner,
in 5 LECTURES ON PRACTICAL CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE THIRD STAGE (Koji Shindo et
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counter arguments.12 In the author's view, the criticisms of the
paternalism of the courts can be categorized as follows. First, the
excessive paternalism of courts may undermine the infrastructure of
our society, which is sustained by self-supporting individuals. If
parties could always rely on the courts' help, they would have little
incentive to make efforts towards self-help. Second, paternalism may
also hamper free competition between attorneys. As long as the
courts remain paternalistic, an attorney does not have the incentive to
refine his skills, because the outcome of the case is not necessarily
dependent on his proper legal activity. Third, when courts act
paternalistically they are consuming judicial resources that could be
spent in other cases. Fourth, it is not true that judges can always find
substantive justice. Substantive justice can be found through
cooperation among neutral judges, zealous attorneys and self-
supporting parties. Finally, substantive justice does not always have a
paramount value. Procedural justice can sometimes outweigh
substantive justice.
Paternalism under a non-sanction scheme may cause an
additional problem. This is because under a non-sanction scheme,
diligence often does not pay, leading to significant unfairness between
the parties. This can be easily shown by a simple example. Suppose
the court requested both parties to submit briefs within thirty days
and the plaintiff complied while the defendant did not. Under a non-
sanction scheme, the effort of the plaintiff yields no return and the
unfaithfulness of the defendant carries no sanction. To be sure, the
court can impose de facto sanctions. Such de facto sanctions,
however, might be unpredictable and irresponsible. For instance, the
court can take the fact that the defendant acted unfaithfully into
consideration when it renders judgment. But the parties will not be
able to predict this result during Oral Argument. Consequently, the
parties are placed in the stressful situation of developing their
strategies based on uncertain outcomes of the litigation.
Furthermore, as there are no established rules as to de facto
sanctions, the discretionary powers of courts are virtually impossible
to control. In short, a non-sanction scheme has the potential to create
al. eds., forthcoming) (in Japanese).
52. The non-sanction scheme has attained positive results as an institutional tool
to harmonize the several conflicting roles of judges and attorneys. It is also true that
the non-sanction scheme is compatible with a consensus-oriented society and the
spirit of harmony in Japan. However, on the other side of the coin, the scheme can
produce considerable negative side-effects.
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a reality in which judges do nothing in some cases and anything in
other cases. Suppose the defendant tries to make allegations or
produce evidence material to the case after the appropriate stage of
the proceedings. One judge may side with the truth and allow the
allegation or evidence. Another, however, may think that procedural
fairness is more important than substantive justice and dismiss the
allegation or evidence. Although each judge might believe that he or
she is doing the right thing, the result for the parties is totally
different.
In terms of Party Inquiry, a non-sanction scheme may create a
different type of problem. By their very nature, the "duty of good
faith" or the "duty of cooperation to search for the truth," which are
supposed to exist behind the Party Inquiry procedure, conflict with
the duties of attorneys to be zealous advocates and to protect their
clients. A non-sanction scheme is likely to expand the scope of the
conflict, because it provides attorneys with no code of conduct. This
can be illustrated with the following: assuming that there was a
sanction scheme similar to that of American discovery, the party to
whom Party Inquiry is addressed would not have to stand at a
disadvantage. His only choice would be to give a reply; otherwise, he
would be slapped with sanctions. In this sense, a sanction scheme
might declare which values are superior to others. In other words,
attorneys can explain themselves to their clients under a sanction
scheme when they elect to answer Party Inquiry against the wishes of
those clients. The bar associations, which requested the introduction
of Party Inquiry into the New Code, also requested a non-sanction
scheme. However, the advantage of this combination for attorneys is
doubtful. In the author's view, a sanction scheme would protect
attorneys more than a non-sanction scheme." In August 1999, the
Japan Federation of Bar Associations conducted a questionnaire
survey regarding which aspects of the Party Inquiry procedure
respondents thought required improvement. Almost 40 percent of
attorneys expressed dissatisfaction with the non-sanction scheme, and
more than 25 percent of attorneys expressed their view that the Japan
Federation of Bar Associations should press the government to
establish effective sanctions.5
53. See also Sumio Moriwaki, Significance and Problem of Tojisha-Shoukai, 48-10
JIYUU-TO-SEIGI 38, 43-45 (1997) (in Japanese).
54. See THE JAPAN FEDERATION OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS: COUNCIL ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF RESEARCH
INTO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 13 (1999) (in
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On different occasions, attorneys and judges advocating non-
sanction schemes have put forward several reasons showing the
advantages of such schemes over sanction schemes. The reasons they
gave are not necessarily persuasive, however. In the deliberations
over the Schedule of Proceedings by the Working Group of the
Legislative Council, for instance, the committee members from the
bar associations insisted that a sanction scheme would be needless
since most attorneys respect deadlines without the threat of any
sanctions. If the argument is true, however, the sanction scheme
should not cause any harm to most attorneys (who act properly) and
impose sanctions only on the few attorneys who act improperly. This
argument is persuasive only if one assumes that judges would often
abuse or misuse their power. To give another example, in the
deliberations regarding inquiry in the pre-litigation stage at the same
Working Group, a proposal was made that a sanction scheme should
be imposed to guarantee the effectiveness of inquiry both at the pre-
litigation stage and at the litigation stage (Party Inquiry). However,
the committee members from the courts argued against it. Their
arguments were mainly based on the concern that judges might be
involved in unnecessary trouble, as discussed above. These examples
show that mutual distrust is the foundation for non-sanction scheme
apologetics.55
8. Conclusion
I propose a simple model analysis. If one puts autonomous
power of attorneys and managerial power of judges into a matrix, the
following would be the possible combinations: (a) a low degree of
autonomous power and low degree of managerial power (low-low
model); (b) a low degree of autonomous power and high degree of
managerial power (low-high model); (c) a high degree of autonomous
power and low degree of managerial power (high-low model); and (d)
a high degree of autonomous power and high degree of managerial
power (high-high model).
Japanese).
55. Although it is generally said that the cause of the failure of the preparatory
procedure contained in the old Code was the severity of its preclusion effect, it has
not yet been proven. Mutual distrust between judges and attorneys may be a critical
reason (or at least one of the reasons) for the failure. See Hiroshige Takata,
Production of New Allegations and Evidence After Conclusion of Issue-Evidence
Management Procedure, in CIVIL PROCEDURE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 359, 365,
374 (2002) (in Japanese).
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The traditional continental style of civil procedure might be
categorized as a low-high model. Civil procedure in the United States
was formerly a high-low model but recently has moved towards a
high-high model. 6 The character of Japanese civil procedure is quite
ambiguous. If one emphasizes the dependence of attorneys on the
court and the de facto discretionary power of judges, it would be
deemed a typical low-high model. On the other hand, if one focuses
on the widespread use of non-sanction schemes and the passive
attitude of judges towards the exercise of their power, it appears to be
more an example of a high-low model.
It is impossible to say that one model is better than another.
However, if one begins with a high degree of autonomous power for
attorneys, it is natural that the managerial power of judges will be
strengthened sooner or later, in order to achieve a balance. Similarly,
when a high degree of judicial managerial power comes first, it is
natural that the autonomous power of attorneys will strengthen to
catch up with the former. Therefore, it might be that any system is
destined to end up with the high-high model in the long term.
If the Japanese system of civil procedure displays some aspects of
the high-low model, it is desirable to seek a way to strengthen the
managerial power of judges. Moreover, if the Japanese system is too
ambiguous to categorize, it is necessary to increase the transparency
of the managerial power of judges. Even if the Japanese system can
be categorized as the low-high model, the defects which have grown
out of indirect or de facto sanctions should be removed. In short, I
suggest that Japanese civil procedure should look towards the high-
high model in the end. 7
In order to achieve a balance, it might be worth considering the
introduction of the mechanism of contempt of court, such as is found
in common law countries. As there has traditionally been no small
degree of mutual distrust between judges and attorneys, it was
previously unrealistic to discuss contempt of court. However, the
situation has been gradually changing. Most notably, about the time
that the New Code of Civil Procedure was enacted, the courts and the
bar associations in various areas of the country jointly established
56. See Roundtable Discussion, supra note 48, at 153 (statement of Masatoshi
Kasai).
57. See Taniguchi, supra note 30, at 501 ("I would like to propose 'the neo
adversary system' with active participation by judges and parties. This is the way to
revive the Verhandlungsmaxime while satisfying the due process value embodied in
the adversary system.").
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consultative bodies to encourage adoption of the practice under the
New Code, and these bodies are still extending the range of their
activities. 8 The success, beyond all expectations, of the 1996 reform
has been broadly attributed to this kind of cooperation. If a
relationship of mutual trust between judges and attorneys is a
fundamental requirement for the introduction of contempt of court
into the justice system, it would appear that fulfillment of this
condition is imminent.
58. See, e.g., Roundtable Discussion, Consulting Group on Operation of the New
Code of Civil Procedure and the New Rules of Civil Procedure (pts. 1-6), 1656
HANREI JIHO 3 (1999), 1657 HANREI JIHO 3 (1999), 1660 HANREI JIHO 3 (1999), 1665
HANREI JIHO 9 (1999), 1668 HANREI JIHO 16 (1999), 1669 HANREI JIHO 9 (1999) (in
Japanese); Symposium, Toward Better Practice of Civil Procedure: Actual Operation
and Ideal Direction of the New Code of Civil Procedure (pts. 1-2), 1662 HANREI JIHO
3 (1999), 1663 HANREI JIHO 9 (1999) (in Japanese); Roundtable Discussion,
Consulting Group on Procedural Administration After Enforcement of the New Code
of Civil Procedure (pts. 1-3), 1735 HANREI JIiio 3 (2001), 1738 HANREI JIhO 3 (2001),
1741 HANREI JIHo 3 (2001) (in Japanese); Symposium, Plan for Civil Procedure in the
21st Century, 1063 HANREI TAIMUZU 4 (2001) (in Japanese); KYOTO STUDY GROUP
FOR SIMULATION OF THE NEW CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, SIMULATION OF THE NEW
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2001).
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